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This paper analyzes how innovation in services is being organised in the 
telecommunication industry after the bubble burst in the beginning of the 2000’s and 
how BT is applying the concept of ‘open innovation’ in order to sustain its 
competitiveness. After the bubble burst in the beginning of the 2000’s, the 
telecommunications industry is trying to find its way to growth. Internet services and 
broadband have changed the way customers perceive communication services. 
Traditional telecommunication companies, like BT, Deutsche Telekom and France 
Telecom have been urging to change in order to survive and sustain its 
competitiveness. One outcome of the industry was that the traditional PSTN (Public 
Switched Telecommunications Network) technology was not suitable anymore to 
deliver the multimedia services demanded by customers. The IP (Internet Protocol) 
has become an unprecedented agreement in the telecommunications industry and the 
traditional telecommunications companies started to transform its infrastructure based 
on this Internet-based technology. While this infrastructure transformation is under 
way, another huge challenge is to change the way these traditional 
telecommunications companies create, integrate and deliver new services. Service 
innovation on top of the IP platform is the ultimate challenge. The research was 
conducted through interviews and analysis of documents such as reports, newspaper 
articles and official Internet websites. The reports included annual reports of suppliers 
and incumbent service providers, and documents of regulators. The interviews were 
conducted with senior managers, managers and other practitioners of incumbent 
telecommunications service providers and suppliers, regulators, consultants and 
market research analysts. Initial findings suggest that incumbent telecommunications 
firms will be increasingly extracting value from platform and software sharing, 
exposing its ‘capabilities’ to third parties and developing business models to 
interoperate with other companies, co-creating new services. Thus, the ability to 
expose their capabilities in services, not to hide them, will be determinant of its 
success. Also important is the ability to offer integrated solutions to large firms as part 
of the service portfolio. And, in this context, the concept of open innovation and value 
innovation also find a fertile ground to be applied in services in the communication 
industry.  Important dynamic capabilities identified in this context are strategic 
planning, project management, new product/service development (especially software 
development), supported by systems integration.  
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Since the bubble burst in the beginning of the 2000’s (some people say 2002), the 
telecommunications industry is trying to find its way to growth and profitability again.  
The “Internet way of doing business” brought new challenges and business models in 
the communications market, and the traditional structure of the telecommunications 
industry was not prepared to respond adequately and timely to it. The convergence of 
markets, where the firms providing fixed and mobile phone, cable TV, satellite, and 
Internet services started to compete for the same customer, established different 
dynamics of providing communication services, redefining their value.   
With the emergence of the IP (Internet Protocol) technology as the ‘de facto’ standard 
for providing voice, video and data services, the traditional telecommunications firms 
started to rethink their infrastructure and deploy IP-enabled systems and equipment. 
The advent of digitalization can be compared to choosing the alphabet, and the advent 
of IP to choosing the language. Now that the language is common, open and known, 
more people and firms are brought into the innovation landscape.  
The emergence and adoption of IP has a direct impact on how traditional 
telecommunications firms innovate. The IP infrastructure, the IP platform, enables the 
development and delivery of a whole set of new services and create a space full of 
uncertainty where innovation can flourish. This creates a situation of both threat and 
opportunity. This paper analyzes how innovation in services is being organised in the 
telecommunication industry from the operator/service provider perspective, after the 
bubble burst in the beginning of the 2000’s. It uses the concepts of open innovation 
and value innovation as a starting point in order to achieve service innovation on top 
of a platform using IP as the common technology for voice, video and data services. 
And it also analyzes the specific case of how BT is applying the concept of ‘open 
innovation’ in order to sustain its competitiveness. Ultimately, the paper deals with 
the issue of innovating the process of innovation, especially in traditional telecom 
operators, for their own survival.  
One of the main outcomes of the process of convergence allowed by IP technologies 
is the capability of BT to offer integrated solutions to interconnect multi-site 
operations of large multinational firms. This allows BT to grow in the business of 
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convergence in the B2B market, while investing in the construction of an IP platform 
(through a large technical project called BT 21st Century Network), preparing to offer 
new converged services both for the business and consumer markets. 
 
2. Research Method 
 
This paper is part of a wider research where the following research method was 
applied. The data collection involved major trade conferences which occurred during 
the years 2005, 2006 and 2007. The attendance to trade conferences was important to 
interview executives, attend their presentations and get insights which would not be 
possible (or would take much more time) only analyzing documents. The interaction 
between the information obtained through interviews and presentations (as primary 
sources) and through documentation (as secondary sources) helped to speed up the 
process and deepen the understanding of the phenomenon.   
Being a recent phenomenon, I adopted an exploratory approach in three stages. The 
research was conducted through interviews and analysis of documents such as reports, 
newspaper articles and official Internet websites. The reports included annual reports 
of suppliers and incumbent service providers, and documents of regulators. The 
interviews were conducted with senior managers, managers and other practitioners of 
incumbent telecommunications service providers and suppliers, regulators, 
consultants and market research analysts. An overview of the documentary and 
interview data used is shown in appendix 1. 
The interviews were conducted during the trade conferences and lasted typically less 
than half an hour. I organised a questionnaire with several questions related to my 
research and during the trade conferences I adopted the strategy to make few 
questions very focused on the expertise of the interviewee and wherever possible, 
made the same question to many interviewees until I was satisfied. I tried though to 
cover all the questions in one trade conference. Then, whenever possible, I compared 
with the documentary data, trying to confirm or not the information obtained in the 
following trade conference. Dubious or ambiguous information I have either 
discarded or considered for a discussion topic. When necessary and possible, I 
contacted again some previous interviewees (by telephone and/or e-mail) for 
clarification or to obtain more information.  
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3. Literature Review 
 
In order to address the issue of how the traditional telecommunications operators like 
BT are changing their innovation processes, I review the literature on innovation 
models, including the concepts of open and value innovation in order to relate to the 
empirical findings. These empirical findings could be separated into infrastructure 
transformation and service innovation. As the infrastructure transformation is the 
construction of a platform based on the Internet Protocol (IP), I review the literature 
about platform innovation. The ability to develop new services faster, cheaper and 
better is addressed under the theory of service innovation. New services can be 
developed on top of the platform (i.e. not necessarily owning the infrastructure, like 
the services provided by Internet firms such as Google and Yahoo) or through the 
platform (such as the integrated solutions offered by BT to large multinational firms, 
which are services linked to the provision of infrastructure).  
3.1. Innovation Models 
There are some innovation models in the literature which are relevant for the context 
of this research. Afuah (2003, p.18) divides the innovation models into static and 
dynamic ones. Among the static innovation models, he cites: Schumpeter, 
incremental-radical dichotomy, Abernathy-Clark, Henderson-Clark, disruptive 
technological change, innovation value-added chain, strategic leadership and 
familiarity matrix. Among the dynamic models: Utterback-Abernathy, Tushman-
Rosenkopf and Foster´s S-Curve. Based on the innovation models, some initial 
comments about them taking into account the context of transition to NGN can be 
made, considering the telecommunications network as a LTS composed by CoPS.  
Schumpeter (1934, , 1950) first suggested that the small entrepreneurs were the 
sources of most innovations and later he suggested that the large firms with some 
degree of monopoly power are most likely to innovate. Certainly, he was talking 
about suppliers, not service providers. In large telecommunications networks, the 
established network has some characteristics like long sales cycle, necessity of huge 
amounts of capital that makes the innovation coming from smaller entrepreneurs less 
likely. However, smaller companies may partner with large companies in order to sell 
to a large incumbent fixed telecommunication operator, so the issue of small 
entrepreneurs and large firms as sources of most innovations becomes blurred.  
 6 
About the incremental-radical dichotomy:  
• The strategic decision to invest focus on the product: the innovation is radical 
if it makes the existing products noncompetitive, and if it is incremental the 
existing products remain competitive (Henderson, 1993). In this context, 
voice-only services would be the ‘product’ to be analyzed.   
• Considering organizational capabilities, the innovation is radical if it is 
competence destroying, and the existing capabilities do not fit anymore, and 
innovation is incremental if it builds on existing capabilities (Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986).  It seems that a new knowledge base needs to be built, 
however existing capabilities can help or be a ‘core-rigidity’ (Leonard-Barton, 
1992, , 1995). The time of transition to NGN is long and existing and new 
capabilities influence each other. Also, considerations of interoperability and 
interconnectivity do not allow the old capabilities to fade quickly.  
• The Abernathy-Clark model unbundles two types of knowledge, the 
technological and the market, and they suggest that incumbents may 
outperform new entrants in ‘radical’ innovations when technological 
capabilities are destroyed but market ones remain intact (Abernathy and Clark, 
1985). In the context of this research, technological capabilities are destroyed, 
but not overnight and not totally. More discussion about market capabilities 
needs to be done, as it does not seem a question of being destroyed or not, but 
how existing and new capabilities interact and emerge.  
The Henderson-Clark model tries to explain why incumbent firms may fail in 
incremental innovations. They unbundle technological knowledge into component and 
architectural, and call incremental innovation when both are enhanced, and radical 
when both are destroyed. They claim that architectural innovation (when component 
knowledge is maintained and architectural is destroyed) may be wrongly assumed as 
incremental one, so that incumbents fail because they are not able to change the 
routines and procedures which deals with the architectural knowledge (Henderson and 
Clark, 1990). Initial evidences indicate that in the transition to NGN, both component 
and architectural knowledge are destroyed, compared to PSTN. As Henderson and 
Clark (1990) define component and architecture knowledge in the discrete product 
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level, it is necessary to redefine them in the context of telecommunications networks 
as LTS. 
In the disruptive technological change model, Christensen (1997) distinguishes 
sustaining from disruptive technology, claiming that for disruptive technologies: the 
initial product performance is worse, although there are other features that some few 
customers value; products are typically cheaper, simpler, smaller and, frequently, 
more convenient to use; there is no clear market for its products; profits are lower than 
in mainstream markets/current business. One example is the packet-switching 
communications networks as a disruptive technology compared to the circuit-switched 
telecommunications networks (Christensen, 1997, p. xxv). 
The case studies presented in the research of disruptive technologies are hard disk 
drives, mechanical excavators, electric power vehicles (Bower and Christensen, 1995, 
Christensen, 1997); minicomputers/PCs, ink-jet printers (Christensen and Overdorf, 
2000). Rarely the case studies address the context of complex products and systems 
(CoPS), as mentioned by Miller et al. (1995) and defined by Hobday (1998). In this 
context, the customer is more sophisticated and the innovation faces more inertia 
(Davies, 1996). Voice over IP (VoIP) is usually called as a disruptive innovation in 
the telecommunications industry. As the word ‘disruptive’ is being overused, better 
analysis needs to be done in order to verify if it is not being misused.  
The innovation value-added chain model considers not only the capabilities and 
competitiveness of the innovative firm, but also the capabilities and competitiveness 
of the firm´s suppliers, customers and complementary innovators. The firm´s 
ecosystem may explain the failure of incumbents in incremental innovations and their 
success in radical ones (Afuah and Bahram, 1995). During the transition, and the 
incumbent fixed telecommunications operator being a user or adopter of the 
technology, not the supplier, its innovation value-added chain and the suppliers and 
partners chosen to compose the ecosystem are important for the success of the 
transition. This innovation cannot be analysed isolated from its suppliers, customers 
and complementary innovators.  
The strategic leadership view highlights the role of top management in recognizing, 
adopting and supporting the innovation. The top management´s dominant logic may 
explain the fact that incumbents embrace radical innovations in early stages 
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(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990, Hambrick and Mason, 1984). The fact that BT has 
taken such a radical approach may be linked with the top management´s dominant 
logic. This is discussed in section 5. 
The familiarity matrix concentrates on how the firm adopts the innovation as the 
determinant of its success or failure. It argues that the more unfamiliar are the 
technological and market knowledge, the more the firm needs to look outside its 
boundaries in order to innovate (Roberts and Berry, 1985). For a service provider, 
adopting an innovation means buying technology. The whole discussion about 
familiarity is about selecting suppliers. Selecting more familiar suppliers was an issue 
during monopolistic times. This may be changing now with the transition to NGN in a 
more competitive market.  
The Utterback-Abernathy dynamic model of innovation describes three phases of 
innovation: the fluid, transitional and specific phase. The fluid phase is characterized 
by technological and market uncertainties and by product innovation. The transitional 
phase begins when uncertainty is reduced by the emergence of a dominant design and 
the emphasis shifts from product to process innovation. In the specific phase, the rate 
of product and process innovation declines, it occurs more process innovation, and 
product innovation is mainly incremental, and the competition is more based on lower 
cost (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975, Abernathy and Utterback, 1978, Utterback, 
1994). Miller et al. (1995) argue that the life cycle of CoPS tend to remain in the fluid 
phase of product innovation. This happens because their analysis is limited to the 
supply of CoPS, and does not include the adoption of CoPS by, for example, 
incumbent fixed telecommunications operators, where process innovation takes place 
and CoPS are used to provide services to mass market. Dominant design is achieved 
in this context in industrial level through standardization bodies like ITU-T. It seems 
that the dichotomy product and process innovation is reasonable, but product 
innovation is mostly in the supplier and process innovation in the telecom operator.  
The Tushman-Rosenkopf model describes four phases for the technology life cycle: a 
technological discontinuity, an era of ferment, a dominant design and an era of 
incremental change. It deals with complex innovations, arguing that external, socio-
political factors may become more relevant with the increasing complexity of 
innovations. Different capabilities are needed in each phase and firms try to influence 
the evolution of the innovation and establish an industry standard (Tushman and 
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Rosenkopf, 1992). This model seems to represent better the way innovation occurring 
in the transition to NGN, coupling suppliers and telecom operators.   
The S-Curve deals with the prediction of the arrival of a technological discontinuity. 
At its physical limit, the return on effort of the old technology becomes too little and a 
new technology emerges to overcome it (Foster, 1986). The case of PSTN, based on 
circuit-switched technology is the typical one. However, only the technological issue 
does not explain the whole story, it is necessary to include at least the economic issues.  
It is interesting to consider the concept of ‘open innovation’, developed recently by 
Chesbrough (2003), pointing out the changing principles surrounding R&D activities, 
where it is less important to have a central laboratory, as external knowledge is more 
available, and firms can benefit from them, and even trade the outcomes of its internal 
R&D activities which were not fruitful inside the firm, but may find another context 
where it may flourish. The concept of open innovation stresses the availability of 
technology and different options for telecom operators to deploy it. Chesbrough 
(2003) shows how Cisco overcame Lucent using a different process of innovation less 
based on its own R&D and relying more on partnerships and acquisitions. Both 
Lucent and Cisco are suppliers of equipment. Is open innovation also being practiced 
by the large users of such equipment, i.e., the telecommunications operators like BT, 
Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom? 
The concept of value innovation stresses that ‘market boundaries and industry 
structure are not given and can be reconstructed by the actions and beliefs of industry 
players’ (Kim and Mauborgne, 2005, p. 17). Value innovation is about creating ‘new 
best-practice rules by breaking the existing value-cost trade-off and thereby creating a 
blue ocean’ (Kim and Mauborgne, 2005, p.18). It redefines value from the customer 
perspective, changing processes and practices common to mainstream firms and/or 
taking advantage of practices/values of adjacent markets, reshaping market 
boundaries.  
The telecommunications operators are becoming service providers. All the 
transformation in their infrastructure, with the adoption of IP, does not make sense if 
they cannot provide new services or the same service in different ways. Thus, their 
final objective is service innovation: the creation and delivery of new services that 
will sustain their competitiveness.  
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3.2. Platform Innovation 
From the infrastructure perspective, the transition to NGN of telecommunications 
networks may be viewed as what Hughes (1983, , 1987, , 1992) calls Large Technical 
Systems (LTS), whose main components would be Complex Products and Systems 
(CoPS), such as defined in Miller et al. (1995), Davies (1997) and Hobday (1998). 
Davies (1996) has already examined the telecommunications network as a LTS, but 
the aim here is to extend his analysis, including more recent events of 
telecommunications industry, especially the transition to NGN. In LTS, the unit of 
analysis is a complex system, defined as ‘coherent structures comprised of interacting, 
interconnected components [ranging from] relatively simple machines to regional 
electricity supply networks’ (Hughes, 1983, p. ix). Davies (1996) argues that this 
definition is different from the concept of complex systems offered by Miller et 
al.(1995), where ‘the unit of analysis is the product and the nature of its production: 
that is the supply of large, complex, customized, engineering-intensive products or 
systems, in which production is of “one-off” kind, usually on a project basis, to meet 
the requirements of individual customers’ (Davies, 1996, p. 1145-1146). Some related 
researches (Prencipe, 2000, Hardstone, 2004, Rycroft and Kash, 1999) investigate the 
context of Complex Products and Systems (CoPS), as categorized by Hobday (1998), 
from the supplier perspective. Davies and Brady (2000) also approach the 
organisational capabilities in CoPS from the supplier perspective. Little attention is 
given to the user perspective. In fact, Prencipe, Davies and Hobday (2003, p.11) 
affirms that ‘currently research barely scratches the surface of systems integration 
from the user perspective’. In this research, the incumbent telecommunications 
service providers are users of CoPS, and in the transition process they need to develop 
new capabilities to adopt CoPS, and at the same time, make old capabilities that are 
not useful anymore go away. This context leads to the question if systems integration 
and project management capabilities need to be matched by the user, and, if positive, 
to what extent.  
The framework of analysis, as argued by Davies (1996), should take into account not 
only the technical, but also the economic and political issues surrounding the 
transition to NGN, considering the concepts of LTS and CoPS. Economies of scale, 
scope and system explain the innovation paths found in the evolution of the system. 
Economies of scale are obtained by cost reduction when using larger networks to 
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produce a defined product or service (Chandler, 1990). Economies of scope are cost 
advantages obtained when providing various services with the same infrastructure at a 
lower cost when providing the services separately using separate infrastructures 
(Chandler, 1990). Economies of system are ‘more specific reductions in cost arising 
from improvements in control components [whose function] is to manage load and to 
control traffic flows’ (Davies, 1996, p. 1163). Political issues are represented by 
regulatory ones such as required by the Office of Communications (Ofcom) in the UK, 
and competitive issues raised by competitors and users. Davies (1996) also highlights 
some Hughesian concepts of momentum and inertia, typical of LTS. Momentum 
makes the system evolve and expand, while inertia makes any change on its current 
status of evolution more difficult, the larger the system.  
Complex systems have been studied by several authors (Rycroft and Kash, 1999, 
Miller et al., 1995, Davies, 1997, Hobday, 1998, Hobday et al., 2000). The category 
of Complex Products and Systems (CoPS) is used to distinguish from the mass 
production industries, such as the ones addressed in the studies of disruptive 
technologies. CoPS are defined as ‘high cost, engineering intensive products, systems, 
networks and constructs’ (Hobday, 1998, p. 690). Usually, they require a high variety 
of distinct knowledge bases, intense user and other supplier involvement, stretching 
the boundaries of the organisations involved in the production and delivery of CoPS. 
CoPS have substantial differences from mass produced goods, such as extended life 
cycles (maybe for decades), long time to decide to invest (meaning long sales cycles 
for suppliers). They are not mass produced and usually produced in small batches or 
through one-off projects (Hobday, 1998).  
Some CoPS are standalone (e.g. flight simulator, as approached in Miller et al., 1995), 
but some have to be integrated to existing CoPS, as it is usually the case for 
telecommunications. If the legacy system is to be replaced, it usually takes some time, 
maybe years for that to happen. Meanwhile, the legacy and the new system need to 
interoperate.  
Davies and Hobday (2005) show how innovation is managed in the supply of CoPS. 
The transition to NGN is an opportunity to study the innovation management in the 
adoption of CoPS by incumbent telecommunication fixed-line operators.  
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One of the difficulties when using the approach of LTS is how to define ‘large’. The 
incumbent fixed-line telecommunications networks are big enough to be considered 
large, and it has the characteristics of interconnectivity and interoperability, which 
makes the issue of defining its boundaries a challenging one. Telecommunications 
operators, like BT, are users of CoPS produced by suppliers such as Ericsson, Alcatel 
and Siemens. Once such CoPS are deployed, they form the network, a Large 
Technical System (LTS), to be used by other users: consumers and small, medium and 
large businesses and organisations. One of the limitations of LTS literature is 
considering the influence of these last users on inducing innovation and transforming 
the systems (Summerton, 1994). This influence needs to be addressed in this work, as 
the services associated with this network/LTS are becoming more and more 
‘customer-centric’. Also, the LTS approach does not pay much attention to the 
organisational aspect of the technological systems, focusing more on the interrelation 
of the various components, where changing one component may impact positively or 
negatively other components within the system (Constant, 1987). The aim of 
analyzing BT transition to NGN is to address this issue of organisational change 
within the LTS.  
In the pursuit of establishing the infrastructure and service layers, incumbent telecom 
operators struggle to establish platforms that will allow the development of new 
services.  These platforms are composed by complex systems (each such component 
may cost millions of US dollars). These complex systems are interconnected forming 
a large technical system – LTS (cf. Hughes  (1987)). And the LTS would have 
interfaces for exposure and for interaction with their users (the users can interfere in 
their design and in the development of new services). For modelling the infrastructure, 
I will use then the literature that is related to Complex Systems, CoPS (complex 
products and systems), LTS and platforms. Platform is defined in Oxford Dictionary 
as ‘level surface raised above the surrounding ground or floor, esp one from which 
public speakers, performers, etc. can be seen by their audience’ (Oxford, 1989). This 
definition highlights an important feature of platforms: visibility to the audience. The 
visibility corresponds to some kind of exposure to the audience, who can be 
customers or users in the telecommunications industry context. Thus, platform seems 
to be better than system, as this last one does not highlight the visibility or exposure of 
the system to customers and users, such a way that these last ones can influence its 
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design and the products and services derived from the platform. Interestingly, Gawer 
and Cusumano (2002, p. 2-3) define high-tech platform as ‘an evolving system made 
of interdependent pieces that can each be innovated upon’. This definition seems to be 
still highly dependent on system and does not emphasize the visibility or exposure of 
the system to the ‘audience’. It emphasizes though the interdependency of the various 
systems’ parts and the evolution through innovation of each part. These are 
characteristics already emphasized in systems.  
On top of the infrastructure, i.e., the platform, new services will be developed. One 
major characteristic that makes the NGN different from PSTN is the level of 
interaction with users and customers that was not possible (or desirable) before. This 
interaction leads to different forms of collaboration, which depend on the degree of 
openness of the interfaces provided by the incumbent telecom operator. This notion of 
platform is being applied by Internet firms like Skype as well. After establishing free 
and low cost voice communication through the Internet, now Skype is inviting other 
firms to develop applications on top of their platform.  
The concept of platform also tries to give the notion of something in transit, moving 
or ultimately changing. This is the case of the launching platform for spaceships, the 
boarding platforms in train stations and airports, and the petroleum platforms.  
Both the infrastructure and the service level depend on some degree of openness for 
the different actors to interact and integrate their efforts into new products and 
services.  
Usually the literature on New Service Development (NSD) and New Product 
Development (NPD) assume that the ‘producer’ already knows the end service to be 
developed and then describes the whole process of development and delivery. This 
research does not have this focus. It is concerned with the process of building a 
‘generic’ platform where new services can be developed in the future without 
knowing exactly what this new services will be. One challenge here is the mind set. 
Some executives in the trade conferences seem not to be very comfort with this idea. 
A recurrent question was: what are exactly the services that will be developed in this 
platform that will render the desired revenues and profits in the future? And by the 
way, when is ‘in the future’ ‘exactly’? After some time trying to find the ‘killer 
application’, the industry gave up trying to find it. And many said that there was no 
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‘killer application’, but a ‘cocktail of applications’, i.e., a set of applications that 
would move in and out of the market, and that the platform should be prepared to this 
new dynamic. This ‘new dynamic’ refers mainly to the ‘time-to-market’ to develop 
new services, now measured in months and weeks (even days), not years (as it was in 
the past with the PSTN voice services).  
The notion of platforms as noted earlier emphasizes the visibility or exposure of the 
internal system to the external system. It also lends the idea of flux or flow in the 
interfaces. There is a literature stream in product innovation, where the concept of 
product platform is used (see, for example, Meyer and Mugge (2001), Meyer and 
DeTore (2001), Tatikonda (1999), Meyer and Dalal (2002)). 
The concept of platform is a ‘common sense way for a firm to leverage technologies 
into new markets and, at the same time, reduce per-unit costs through more efficient 
production and procurement (Meyer and Mugge, 2001, p. 26). Here the idea of 
platforms is applied to products (usually mass produced) and from the supplier 
perspective (like IBM and SUN). And the issue of product complexity is very generic 
and not well defined. Usually this literature of product platform is connected to 
manufacturing, and thus production. This is not the case for incumbent telecom 
operators that have outsourced their equipment development to specialised equipment 
providers. Also, the reduction in per-unit cost does not explore the potential of 
different forms of collaboration, as the Internet culture is making it possible and more 
popular.  
Gawer and Cusumano (2002) put forward the idea of platform leadership, and the 
examples are firms like Intel, Cisco Systems and Microsoft. Their perspective, as well 
as of those from the product platform literature, are from the suppliers perspective and 
usually the literature does not focus on how large users build their platforms in order 
to deliver new services. Telecom operators now use Cisco Systems and Microsoft 
platforms to build their own. The leadership (from the suppliers’ perspective) consists 
in establishing market standards and architectures that will be adopted by large users.  
The discussions about platform in the literature usually concentrate on the product as 
the unit of analysis (see, for example, van de Paal and Steinmueller (1998) and 
Mansell and Steinmueller (2000) for a discussion on multimedia platforms, analysing 
DVD and CD-ROM;  Gawer (2000) about Intel’s microprocessor; Gawer and 
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Cusumano (2002) about Intel, Cisco, Microsoft, Palm, NTT DoCoMo and Linux). 
The notion of platform does not go to the large ones being implemented by incumbent 
network operators, like BT, France Telecom and Deutsche Telekom. Gawer and 
Cusumano (2002) used the example of NTT DoCoMo to illustrate how NTT is using 
different business models to create an environment where third parties are encouraged 
to develop applications for their mobile phones. This is part of the scope that this 
research intends to achieve. The platform being developed is for any device (mobile 
and fixed phone, PC, laptop, blackberry, IPod, Palm, …). 
Some characteristics of platforms are important to take into account in order to 
understand the platform-centric organisation. And how platform innovation leads and 
facilitates service innovation in the telecom industry. Firms organise differently in 
order to develop and implement capabilities to adopt a platform-centric organisation. 
Platform thinking has significant implications on the way firms organise innovation in 
services (Meyer and DeTore, 2001).  Some pitfalls when transitioning from single-
product thinking to platform thinking are (according to Meyer and DeTore (2001):   
• The lack of experience of senior executives to build platforms. These senior 
executives may bring with them the mindset of single and sequential. product or 
service development. The organisation is focused on the next product or service 
and does not recognise the value of streams of new products and services.  
• The firm is focused on a single market. And focused on the same requirements of 
customers for a long time, which gives room to disruptive technologies (cf. 
Christensen (1997)) to take over its market. 
• The best people in the firm are too busy paying attention to short-term business, 
maintaining the existing products and services, not developing or thinking about 
new ones.  
• Reusability is considered a good idea, but some firms think that it will be difficult 
for different parts of the organisation to work together.  
• Platforms are considered only as technical ones, involving only engineers to 
decide on their architecture.  
• The firm has no process to define new platforms. The project control and 
processes are designed for single product or service approach.  
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Paoli (2003, p. 157) mentions the various knowledge bases the integrator needs to 
have in order to:  
- put together the parts; 
- manage the interfaces; 
- organize the architecture; 
- invent the ‘missing’ links (e.g. to integrate). 
In order to ‘invent the missing links’, the systems integrator needs to develop 
organisational and technological capabilities in order to succeed in a changing 
environment.  
Wise and Baumgartner (1999) stated that “smart manufacturers are moving 
downstream for a very simple reason: that´s where the money is”. Manufactured 
products are becoming commodities as long as competition becomes fiercer, reducing 
profitability and the installed base becomes big and the extended product life cycle 
makes the necessity of substitution or replacement not so demanding. This leads to a 
strategy of diversification, where the company decides to move to services based on 
its existing products or on products and systems from others, offering integrated 
solutions, which, according to Davies (2003) comprise the following four sets of 
capabilities: systems integration, operational services, business consultancy and 
financial services (p. 334). The integrated solutions are usually complex products and 
systems (CoPS), defined as “high cost, engineered-intensive products, systems, 
networks, constructs” (Hobday, 1998). Thus, the systems integrators have the 
opportunity not only to provide the integrated solution, but also to operate and 
maintain the product/system (operational services), provide professional services to 
upgrade or improve the system performance (also in other areas of the firm, resulting 
from the deployed integrated solution) and offer financial packages, facilitating the 
cash flow of the customer, as usually the amount of money and the amortization 
period are high (Davies, 2003). 
Although many manufacturing companies are moving downstream into services, there 
are service companies moving upstream and acting as systems integrators also 
(Davies, 2003).  
All the infrastructure transformation that the telecommunication industry is 
undertaking, adopting the IP technology, has the ultimate objective of creating and 
delivering new services which will sustain their competitiveness. Thus, service 
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innovation becomes an essential part of the strategy of telecommunication firms. The 
framework of analysis for service innovation presented by Hull and Tidd (2003, p. 
139) highlights performance, SPOTS (Strategy, Process, Organisation, 
Tools/Technology) model, environmental and national context. An adapted 
framework for the context of this research is presented in figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1- Framework of Analysis for Service Innovation in the context of incumbent 
fixed-line telecommunications operators in transition to NGN. 
Source: Adapted from Hull and Tidd (2003, p. 139)) 
This framework highlights the system integration in the service/application level, 
where as Prencipe, Davies and Hobday (2003) focus on system integration in the 
product or infrastructure level. Performance in this context is measured by the 
decreasing time to develop new services and the decreasing costs to maintain and 
upgrade the network/infrastructure.  
In order to examine the organization of innovation in services in the 
telecommunication industry from the telecommunication operator perspective, the 
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and open innovation, and uses the concept of CoPS (Complex Products and Systems) 












Figure 2 – Framework of analysis combining service, value and open innovation.  
 
4. Telecommunications Evolution to the Transition to NGN 
 
The telecommunications industry comes from a history of monopolistic, and 
frequently, national supplier and buyer relationship. This was supposed to be a long-
term relationship with a reasonable and predictable market share and revenues. With 
the privatisation and liberalisation of major markets in the world this situation 
changed and competition became fiercer and a new order emerged. Competition 
forced a more customer focused approach in order to supply end-to-end solution to 
satisfy specific needs of the customers, and search for markets beyond the ones the 
players (suppliers and operators) were used to sell and operate. Capabilities like 
project management and systems integration became more important.  
From time to time, the innovation history experiences short time of radical innovation 
followed by long time of incremental innovation, during which the new technology 
diffuses and the institutions adapt to it. After this long time of incremental innovation, 
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1986, Utterback and Suarez, 1993). It is interesting to analyze the period when the 
radical innovation takes place, i.e., when technological and institutional transitions 
take place. Damanpour (1991) makes a distinction between technical and 
administrative innovations, where the technical innovation refers to improved or 
completely new products, services and processes, and administrative innovation refers 
to organisational structure and administrative processes. It is important to note that 
when referring to the transition in this context it is also important to address the 
process of letting go old processes which are not useful anymore. It seems that the 
bigger the firm and the more people are dedicated to old processes the more difficult 
is to promote change in the firm, and these old processes may even become a 
hindrance to change or become what Leonard-Barton (1992) calls ‘core rigidity’.  
During the evolutionary time of a technology, not only the technology but also the 
institutions develop and accumulate capabilities which are useful to deal with the 
current evolving situation. The process of evolution of capabilities implies in solving 
problems in order to improve the performance of the technology and satisfy the 
necessities and demands. However, a time may reach, when the accumulation of 
capabilities lead to the saturation of capabilities and an incremental effort to improve 
the technology does not solve the changing and critical problems and new demands of 
customers and market. Then, there is a fertile ground for a radical shift.  
Hall and Preston (1988) argue that from 2004 the fifth Kondratieff wave is taking 
place, calling it the information age of convergent IT (Information Technology). In 
telecommunications, after mechanical, electronic and digital switching, IP switching 
is supposed to be the fourth wave, where ‘traditional barriers of geography and 
technology have faded away’ (BT, 2005a). The transition and evolution of large 
technical systems have an inherent degree of uncertainty which varies with time. At 
the very beginning, the uncertainty is higher, but as the system evolves it decreases to 
a certain minimum level. 
Mansell and Steinmueller (2000) describe the non-executed plan to convergent 
infrastructure based on the development of ISDN (Integrated Services Digital 
Network), based on 128 kbps during the late 1980s, at 2.048 kbps at the beginning of 
the 1990s and broadband ISDN, in the 10 Mbps range, by the mid-1990s. Instead of 
implementing a higher performance ISDN network, the development of the 
infrastructure in Europe has continued ‘with a combination of circuit-switched 
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telephony, leased-line, and packet-switch networks based upon heterogeneous 
technical standards’ (p. 100). During that time, the concept of IN (Intelligent 
Network) was developed, taking advantage of computer technology and software-
based functionalities, and incorporating them into the telecommunications networks. 
The potential of IN in generating new services and increasing economic wealth started 
to be explored. Mansell (1993) explores the development of the IN in some developed 
countries and shows the ideas driving it regarding new services. These ideas continue 
alive in the building of NGN.  
By the beginning of the 21st century, IP (Internet Protocol) is becoming the common 
technology of telecommunications to deliver integrated services combining voice, 
data and video. It is an unprecedented agreement in the telecommunications industry 
over a technology. 
In 1998, IP was not still recognized as the dominant technology and many engineers 
believed that ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Mode) would be the preferred packet-
switched technology for multimedia applications. At that time, the major experience 
with IP was through dial-up connections and the quality of experience was such a way 
that it was even difficult to classify it as ‘best effort’ (Hersent et al., 2005). This view 
is reinforced in Mansell and Steinmueller (2000, p. 127), where they provide a 
discussion about the data communication technologies (X.25, IP, Frame Relay and 
ATM) and ask if TCP/IP would be the dominant networking technology for the 
twenty-first century.  
Mansell and Steinmueller (2000) use the theory of technology diffusion to illustrate 
the competition between ISDN and TCP/IP, and show how network externalities 
influenced the diffusion process, endangering the future of ISDN. Although there 
were problems with IP technology regarding real-time applications, support for billing 
and security, nowadays, it is broadly accepted now that IP is winning the race and 
becoming a consensus in the industry. The main lesson from this contest is ‘ignoring 
the diffusion process because of a belief in the technological superiority of a particular 
solution is a dangerous strategy’ (Mansell and Steinmueller, 2000, p. 113).  
In the recent years, broadband connections are increasing and revenues from fixed-
line services are declining. This poses a challenge to fixed-line telecommunication 
operators to create new sources of revenues other than the voice-only services. 
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Convergence has become a central issue. According to Mansell and Steinmueller 
(2000), convergence is related to two ideas: one is that all electronic communications 
can be seen as digital bit streams, so that voice, video and data are seen as bits; the 
second is the impact on industry and market, where the boundaries of fixed and 
mobile operators, broadcast, cable TV companies and internet service providers 
become blurred. From the consumer point of view, there is a whole range of choice 
for devices, like the various models of mobile phones, the iPod, Microsoft´s Xbox, 
Sony´s PlayStation and PSP (PlayStation Portable). And when the consumer sees the 
fixed telephone device it seems too old fashioned. Besides that, Internet-based firms 
like Skype, Yahoo and Google offer a whole range of new services, free or with low 
cost, which challenges the business models of the incumbent firms. For example, in 
2005, a small company called Skype was bought by E-Bay, which paid US$ 2.5 
billion for a company with US$ 60 million of revenues. The commoditization of 
voice-only services and the convergence of industries, services and networks are 
driving the transition to NGN by incumbent operators. More powerful consumer 
devices (e.g. mobile phones, iPods and PSPs) are changing the consumer´s habits and 
expectations about communications services from service providers. Also, the 
broadband networks and the high speed Internet are making possible many services 
unimaginable in a recent past. Internal research conducted in an incumbent fixed 
wireline operator in Brazil indicated that 75% of the lost traffic was to mobile 
operators and 25% was due to the migration from dial-up to broadband Internet 
(AgenciaEstado, 2005). 
To address these challenges, incumbent fixed telecommunications operators are 
building the so-called Next Generation Network (NGN). The concept was extensively 
discussed in many fora in the period of 2000-2003, like in the ITU-T (International 
Telecommunications Union – Telecommunications) and ETSI (Ahmad and Kapoor, 
2005). The NGN is seen as an all-IP, packet-based integrated network, where 
application and services are separated from the transport network, so that voice, video 
and data are transformed into packet data and delivered as integrated services to the 
customer (OECD, 2005). With NGN, it is expected to reduce the complexity of the 
network, and its ‘stove pipes’, where for each service it was necessary to deploy a 
specific network from the backbone to the end customer, increasing overhead costs 
and posing significant problems in terms of flexibility of the service.  
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5. Background of BT and of the Telecommunications Industry Transformation 
 
During the Chairman Sir Iain Vallance leadership, until April 2001, BT’s vision was 
‘to be the most successful worldwide communications group’1. And this was to be 
achieved by ‘seizing the many opportunities open to us in the global market’2. This 
has led BT to make many acquisitions in the 1990’s which resulted in the high amount 
of debt in 2001. Sir Christopher Bland assumed BT as Chairman on 01 May 2001 
with the mission of making a ‘structural and financial transformation of BT’3. As of 
31 March 2001, the net debt reached the unsustainable amount of £27.9 billion after 
the acquisitions made in that fiscal year4. BT was divided by geographical criteria, BT 
UK and BT Worldwide until April 2000, when a new structure was established, taking 
into account market sector rather than geography. It was created four main divisions: 
Ignite, for the broadband IP (Internet Protocol) business; BT Openworld, for the mass 
market internet business; BT Wireless, for the mobile business; and Yell, for 
international directories and e-commerce business 5 . In October 2000, two new 
divisions were created: BT Retail and BT Wholesale. In November 2000, it was 
announced the intentions to sell BT Wireless and Yell in order to reduce debt6. In the 
BT Annual Report of 2001, the vision of ‘to be the most successful worldwide 
communications group’ has disappeared. In February 2002, Ben Verwaayen was hired 
as the new BT CEO (Chief Executive Officer), replacing Sir Peter Bonfield.  
Ben Verwaayen established then a strategy composed of three parts: the first is 
‘passionate concern for […] customers, and a scrupulous focus on their requirements, 
now and in the future’; the second is ‘the pursuit of profitable growth’; and the third is 
‘the delivery of Broadband Britain’, recognising broadband as ‘a critical growth 
opportunity’7. As of May 2002, Ben Verwaayen wrote that ‘after a difficult time for 
the company, we now need to understand our strengths better and play to those 
strenghs’8. In other words, he was re-evaluating BT’s core capabilities and business. 
The former vision of being the most successful worldwide communications group led 
BT to expand its range of activities to unsustainable levels. And his work was to re-
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establish BT’s focus on the customer and not on itself. About the position of BT in the 
market, Ben Verwaayen wrote9: 
Post-privatisation, BT was the benchmark company in the telecommunications 
industry, not just in the UK but in Europe and globally. The bad news is that we’ve 
currently lost pole position. But the good news is that there’s a vacancy. No single 
company in this industry can confidently lay claim to that position at the moment. 
That’s the opportunity and challenge for us. We can become the benchmark once 
again. So, that’s what we’re aiming to do. 
 It seems that the target is still to be the ‘benchmark’, but there is a significant cultural 
shift in terms of achieving that focusing on ‘customer requirements now and in the 
future’ rather than focusing on the greatness of itself.  
The mobile business was demerged on 19 November 2001, Yell business was 
disposed and BT Group plc was formed, consisting of four lines of business: BT 
Retail, BT Wholesale, BT Ignite and BT Openworld. Other business like Japan 
Telecom, J-Phone and Airtel were also disposed to focus on the core business and 
reduce debt10. A possible floatation of BT Ignite was being studied in 200111, but this 
has not occurred. By May 2002, after assuming as BT CEO, Ben Verwaayen wrote 
that ‘the restructuring is done; stability has been achieved’12. In the 2002 financial 
year (ended 31 March 2002), 89% of the BT revenues were obtained within UK. 
Internationalisation was restricted to Europe in the strategy set in 2002. Concert, the 
joint venture with AT&T was also disposed. The seven strategic priorities for the lines 
of business set in 2002 were13:  
• to deliver the highest levels of customer satisfaction performance and reduce the 
number of dissatisfied customers each year; 
• to achieve organic profitable revenue growth, while constraining capital 
expenditure; 
• to put broadband at the heart of BT, expand the market for broadband services and 
create a media-enabled network; 
• to provide solutions and other value-added services for multi-site corporate 
customers in Europe; 
• to place all UK networks under a single management structure and to limit 
investment in legacy voice and data platforms, while migrating operations to new 
platforms; 
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• to use the strength of the BT brand to move into broadband services for 
consumers; and also into related markets, such as communications solutions and 
business mobility services for major business customers; and information and 
communications technology for SMEs; and 
• all delivered by diverse, skilled and motivated people. 
 
From these seven strategic priorities, I would like to highlight some points. The fourth 
priority led BT to rename BT Ignite to BT Global Services and become a leading 
provider of integrated solutions to major customers in Europe. This move to 
integrated solutions is going to be explored in more details in chapter 5. The fifth 
strategic priority led BT to two major initiatives: BT 21CN programme, a mega-
project of £10 billion to be done in 5-6 years; and the open innovation model to 
revitalize the innovation processes within BT.  As a result, the Next Generation 
Network is a network transformation to adopt IP that is needed for incumbents to 
compete in the world of horizontal broadband applications, where exposure of 
capabilities, different forms of collaboration with third parties and new business 
models are important.  
The central question of this research is how the incumbent telecom operators are 
surviving convergence/fierce competition and radical technological change mainly 
after the bubble burst at the beginning of the 2000’s. I examine here the BT case study 
as it has embraced technological change in an unusual way. Also BT seems to be 
taking more radical initiatives in order to stay ahead of their competitors.  Thus, BT, 
as a first and faster mover, was chosen to be the main case study from which possible 
generalisations could be drawn.  
BT in particular was suffering from huge debt problems in the beginning of the 
2000’s. In 2001 when Christopher Bland joined BT as Chairman of the Board, BT had 
had £ 28 billion in debts. ‘We went through a traumatic situation. […] We could do 
nothing. We could only pay our debts at that point’14. ‘BT took some big decisions at 
that time to rapidly address its debt mountain and that created malleability within BT - 
an understanding that change was needed and that the old BT wasn't right anymore’15. 
It is important to note that the debt problem occurred in the beginning of 2000’s was a 
huge crisis in the history of BT and may have accelerated its change process. As Matt 
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Bross notes, that moment of crisis brought some ‘malleability’ to BT’s culture and 
open the mind of BT employees to a ‘new BT’. The Chairman Christopher Bland 
prepared the ground to bring new people to BT and in 2002, a new CEO was hired, 
Ben Verwaayen, and also a new CTO, Matt Bross, this last responsible for the open 
innovation and technology strategy at BT. Four years later, in 2005, ‘the debt problem 
has been addressed, we've changed from just being a telco to also being a major 
supplier of ICT services, and we've also revitalised our approach to innovation’16. The 
main areas to work in telecom in this transformation are ‘ICT for business, broadband 
the consumer, and convergence of services where you bring things together. That’s 
how you build innovation’17. ICT services seems to be a core competence of BT. The 
issues that has been addressed more intensely in the last years are the broadband 
adoption in the UK and the revitalisation of the approach to innovation (due to 
converged services). This revitalised approach to innovation has been called open 
innovation.  
While analyzing the data, it became clear that the four main issues or challenges for 
the transition to Next Generation Network and BT survival under the technological 
change are:  
• Reduction of debt (at £27.9 billion in 2001), finding its strengths (core 
business/capabilities) and consolidating its operations. One of the strategic 
priorities was to consolidate BT and present it as one BT to the customer. A 
strength that BT has been exploring during this technological change to IP is to 
offer networked solutions to multi-site customers, the networked IT services. 
• The construction of a new infrastructure based on IP (Internet Protocol) 
technology. For this BT established a large and complex project: BT 21CN. Here 
the aim is to build a network that will serve as a platform that will allow the 
development of new services by BT and with the collaboration of external parties. 
Main capabilities in focus here are project management and systems integration 
for large and complex projects in the context of a large user of technology and 
complex products and systems.  
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• To revitalise the innovation process within BT. It means to innovate the way BT 
innovates. A new structure is put in place, where innovation is owned at the 
chairman level. Also, this shows how BT is reorganised its structure for 
innovation and establishing mechanisms to take better advantage of external 
innovations and integrate into BT’s internal processes. It also shows how BT is 
using venture capital and Intellectual Property rights to foster innovation. The 
theory behind this analysis is the Open Innovation Model.  
• Service innovation for ‘horizontal broadband applications’, where the 
management of creativity, user innovation and convergence of services play a 
major role. Internet and broadband have been changing the perception of 
customers about services and their active participation and collaboration on 
shaping them. Developing services from the customer perspective, taking into 
account the total customer experience, forces BT to establish new processes for 
service development, involving the customer and using multidisciplinary teams. 
The main capability here is software development and the main challenge is on 
creating in collaboration with third party firms. The issue of business model 
becomes of central importance, as the value of the platform will be determined by 
the appropriate business model for each service or package that will be delivered 
through the new IP infrastructure.  
One recurrent theme in BT transformation and fast implementation of the NGN 
through their 21CN project is innovation, i.e., changing the way BT innovates: 
innovating innovation. So, innovation processes at BT are examined and the concept 
of ‘open innovation’ is used as a background to analyze the data acquired. Also the 
capabilities of systems integration, project management and software development, 
highlighted by the CoPS (Complex Products and Systems) research are examined in 
the context of the user of the technology.  
One answer to the question of how BT is surviving the radical technological change 
and competitive market provided by the adoption of IP and market convergence is 
through changing the way BT innovates both in infrastructure and service layers. But 
how is BT trying to innovate innovation and what are the implications on BT 
organisation and the whole industry? This chapter focuses on BT and the following 
chapters address the innovation issue from an industry perspective, searching for 
generalisation of some of the findings.   
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6. Innovation in the Transition to the Telecommunications NGN  
 
Several start-up suppliers showed up in the market in the late 1990´s. Some are 
struggling to become profitable and others were sold to established suppliers. The 
market for incumbent telecommunications service providers, a typical CoPS context, 
is characterized by long sales and short delivery cycles. It is a very difficult market for 
smaller companies. As an example, BT in the UK announced on April 2005 its 
preferential suppliers for the BT 21st Century Network (BT 21CN), where a massive 
transformation into IP-based Next Generation Network is going to take place. Eight 
suppliers were selected: Siemens, Alcatel, Huawei, Fujitsu, Cisco, Lucent, Ericsson, 
Ciena. They are relatively large firms with strong financial power.  
In the beginning of the 2000´s, several incumbent telecommunications operators have 
been experiencing financial problems. So, the appeal of the IP technology in reducing 
operating and capital expenditures was very strong and made some incumbent 
providers to accelerate its adoption. Another driving force for the massive adoption of 
the IP technology is the announcement of established suppliers in discontinuing the 
development of systems and equipment based on the traditional circuit-switched 
technology, making it unsustainable in the long term. Revenues and profits with 
voice-only services tend to decrease, as competition increases. So, the capability and 
flexibility of service providers in offering new products and services become crucial. 
Market liberalisation and privatisation have been changing the competitive scenario 
for the incumbent service providers. They need to expand to new and foreign markets 
and face fierce competition in their domestic market.  
Innovation may be seen as invention + commercialization (Freeman and Soete, 1997). 
It is important to verify what happens in the interface between invention and 
commercialization, as the organisation which makes the invention may not 
commercialize it, creating various possibilities of purchasing technologies, products 
and ideas from different firms. This is the basis of the concept of open innovation as 
conceptualized by Chesbrough (2003). BT, for example, uses the concept of 
‘innovation continuum’ to highlight its end-to-end process (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3 – The Innovation Continuum at BT 
Source: Dunbar (2005) 
Thus, expanding the concept of innovation and considering it as an end-to-end process, 
we may see it as invention + integration + commercialization, where invention is 
predominantly at the suppliers side; integration is represented by architecting and 
implementing the network (the infrastructure level), highly dependent on project 
capabilities; and commercialization is represented by operating, productising and 
distributing the products and services. The locus of innovation is moving to the edge 
as the processing power of consumer devices and competition increases. It is more 
and more feasible to come up with a new application, select and discard it without 
going into bankruptcy. The cost of failure tends to decrease. Thus, the issue turns out 
not to be a technology driven company but how to leverage those technologies to the 
benefit of customers and shareholders. This makes the issue of not only concentrating 
on internal processes, but also on boundary processes to achieve such aim. Much has 
been researched about supply-push and demand-pull. However, they are not separated. 
The boundary processes link and stretch them. The right timing to deploy the new 
infrastructure and to deliver new services (decreasing delivery time, for example) 
becomes important parts of the innovation strategy. So, including the timing 
dimension, the innovation equation encompasses invention + integration + timing + 
commercialization.   
    The Innovation Continuum 
Implement Channels Productise Invent Architect Operate  
Innovate through the entire value chain 
Deliver Customer Satisfaction and Shareholder Value 
 29 
Although BT, as a large incumbent fixed-line telecom operator, is innovating radically 
in transforming its network, this is not what is happening with other incumbents in 
Europe and throughout the world. Interviewees from other incumbent operators say 
that what BT is doing is ‘too radical’ for their context. Also, in this context, as the 
telecom operators are not producers of technology, they innovate to the extent their 
suppliers innovate. The key innovation factor for the operators is the selection of the 
most appropriate partners. All of the selected BT partners for the BT 21CN project are 
large companies: Siemens, Cisco, Alcatel, Ericsson, Fujitsu, Ciena, Lucent and 
Huawei. The smallest is Ciena. However, the majority of these large firms are 
partnering with smaller firms to supply their solution to BT. As the 
telecommunications networks are Large Technical Systems, where some components 
are CoPS (Complex Products and Systems), the key to innovation and success in the 
market is to combine its core capabilities with those of smaller firms in order to 
deliver complete, end-to-end solutions to sophisticated and demanding business 
customers. Thus, in this context, large firms and small firms partner with each other to 
innovate. It is true however that the IP technology was first developed by smaller, 
non-incumbent firms of the telecommunications market.  
From the perspective of incremental-radical innovation, taking the voice-only service 
as the existing product of incumbent fixed-line telecommunications operators, the 
NGN make it a commodity, which is still used and purchased but also bundled with 
other services. Voice-only service generates less and less revenues. There is a general 
consensus that broadband is cannibalising the incumbents´ business, and there is an 
increasing pressure of Internet companies like Skype, Google and Yahoo with their 
VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) services, pressing prices down and challenging 
incumbent business models. In terms of organisational capabilities, the transition to 
NGN is competence destroying, compared to the PSTN technology. However, most of 
the incumbent operators are making the transition in an ‘incremental’ way, as it takes 
much time, years to complete. In LTS, like the telecommunication networks, there is 
much inertia to change, and it may take much more time to change than in the mass 
market products context. So, incumbents have more time to position themselves in the 
‘radical’ innovation. 
Both component and architectural knowledge are changed in the transition to NGN. 
The component knowledge is not at the level of the microprocessor, transistor, etc., 
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but at the level of telephone exchanges, which can be considered CoPS (Complex 
Products and Systems). BT claims, for example, that the number of ‘elements’ (or 
components) in its network will decrease from 100.000 to 30.000, simplifying the 
network operation and saving BT about £ 1 billion in operational expenses from the 
year 2008/2009. The interconnection of these elements will change such a way that 
there will be a different network configuration and points of presence, where BT 
customers, partners and even competitors connect to BT network. A programme 
called Consult21 was created by BT to deal with this issue of changes in 
interconnection and relationship with stakeholders. Also, there is no one-to-one 
correspondence between the equipment used in PSTN and the one used in NGN, 
which reinforces the component and architectural change.  
The term ‘disruptive’ is being overused in the telecom industry to express the impact 
of VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) on the incumbent telecommunications 
operators business. VoIP and broadband bring with them not only the threat of a new 
technology, but the whole world of Internet and its business model based on free/low 
cost services: disintermediated services which do not pass through the ‘control’ and 
billing system of incumbent operators. VoIP services provided by firms like Skype 
have a disruptive trajectory. However, unlike other markets analysed by Christensen 
(Christensen, 1997, Christensen and Overdorf, 2000, Christensen and Raynor, 2003, 
Christensen et al., 2002), the transformation in telecommunications networks is in a 
Large Technical System (LTS), in a regulated environment and with high inertia. And 
due to this inertia, incumbents are having time to adapt to the new technology and 
their business seems not to be destroyed.  Also, incumbents have the option to partner 
or even buy Internet companies, minimize the effect of VoIP on their core business, 
and learn. For example, BT partnered with Yahoo in 2004 and started offering VoIP, 
but with no reduction in prices. After the purchase of Skype by E-Bay in 2005, BT 
started to offer a VoIP service even cheaper than Skype.  
Innovation in incumbent telecommunications operators cannot be analyzed only 
within the firm. As these operators are large adopters of technologies, the selection of 
suppliers to work with is of the highest importance. Matt Bross, CTO of BT Group, 
characterizes the innovation ‘continuum’ as composed by three elements: research 
and discovery, validate and articulate, and execute (Berris, 2005). It is clear from this 
perspective that the innovation continuum may not happen within one firm, it happens 
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across boundaries, from the invention, through to the supplier´s network and the 
suppliers themselves, to the service providers, the distribution and to the final 
customers. The challenge now is that innovation locus is moving closer to the 
customer. BT and other service providers are starting to invest in a new network to 
provide ‘new services’ without knowing exactly what these services are going to be. 
The new services dilemma breaks the paradigm of the control and predictability: the 
willingness to know how things will end before they begin.  
The fact that BT, as an incumbent, is embracing a radical innovation in a more radical 
way may be partly explained by the strategic leadership. BT changed its top 
management significantly in the beginning of the 2000´s, a few years before 
announcing the BT 21CN. Main changes seem to be in the CEO and CTO positions, 
assumed by outsiders. These may have accelerated the decision-making to deploy the 
BT 21CN.  
Although Miller et al. (1995) argue that innovation in CoPS tends to remain in the 
fluid phase of product innovation of Utterback and Abernathy (1978) model, product 
and process innovation in this context seem to occur in different firms. Product 
innovation is intense on the supplier side, but as soon as it is deployed in the service 
provider network, it begins the process innovation, and a process of mutual adaptation 
occurs between supplier and service provider in order to deliver services to the mass 
market. A dominant design is achieved at the industry level through standardization 
bodies. The Tushman and Rosenkopf (1992) model seems to be the most appropriate 
model for this context of transition to NGN, as it starts to consider the complexity of 
innovation and the external (e.g. socio-political) factors which may interfere in the 
evolution of the innovation.  
Finally, the transition to NGN represents also the ‘saturation’ of a technology: the 
circuit-switched technology of PSTN networks. This is evidenced by the fact that 
many incumbent suppliers announced the discontinuation of their investment in 
products based on circuit-switched technology, intensifying their investments in IP 
technology. The circuit-switched technology seems to have achieved its limit in the 
provision of flexible services which customers are demanding and will demand more 
and more in the future. The S-curve applies in this context and explains one of the 
reasons for the transition to NGN.   
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6.1. Open Innovation at BT 
BT, a traditional telecommunication operator in the UK, has been examining ‘the 
process of innovation itself as they attempt to transform themselves and drive 
sustainable sources of value creation’ (BT, 2006, p. 4).  
Open innovation means that ‘organisations can draw on external resources and best 
practices to complement the value of own “internal” innovation assets – and achieve 
greater real returns on their overall investment in innovation’ (BT, 2006, p. 6). And 
‘innovation itself is valued as a commodity that can be bought and sold, loaned, 
licensed, hedged and re-invested’ (BT, 2006, p. 6). Products and services need to be 
delivered much faster in the past. Traditional firms like BT were used to deliver a 
single or few set of products and services for a long time (usually years), for a definite 
set of customers (with no other significant choices). Now customers have more choice 
and certain services can last few months or even weeks or days. Thus, the capability 
to offer new services faster became too complex for just one firm to provide, relying 
on its internal R&D and product development pipe.  
With the high availability of technology in the telecommunications market, the 
expectation of innovation is higher and incumbent firms, in order to sustain their 
growth and competitive advantage are not expected to innovate alone. In fact, they 
reached a point where external collaboration is needed to sustain growth and 
profitability. One of the arguments of the open innovation model is that large firms do 
less own R&D and rely more on external partners to deliver new products and 
services. In the telecom industry it is known that this shift to less own R&D by the 
incumbent operators was a reality by the end of 1995, when most of the R&D 
performed for the infrastructure (network and its elements) was relegated to the 
specialist equipment providers (Fransman, 2002). During the 2000’s, this situation 
remained the same way for BT.  
In 2002, BT hired a new CTO, Matt Bross, coming from the USA, and with 
experience in a non-incumbent telecom operator, Williams Communications. He says 
that having never worked for an incumbent telco before is positive as he was unafraid 
of breaking the boundaries and changing the innovation processes of BT.18 And that 
seems to be the challenge in the transition to NGN. Surely, implementing the new 
network is a very complex activity, requires a lot of skills in project management and 
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 Interview with BT CTO Matt Bross in Global Telecoms Business, Sept/Oct 2005 n82, p.34 
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systems integration. However, one central challenge is to change people’s mind, 
behaviour and attitude: people are used to PSTN processes and naturally resist 
changing to the new NGN-based processes19. The PSTN processes are related to 
functional structure and clear end services, and the NGN processes are related to 
platform multifunctional structure and on enabling new services (without having a 
clear idea of what services will be developed). BT’s approach to innovation is going 
to change the way the firm operates20. This new way of operation, new innovation 
processes is the focus here.  
6.2. Value Innovation 
Services provided in the Internet are changing the way customers perceive value. 
Besides the low cost airlines (like EasyJet and Ryanair) and the travel sites (like 
Expedia and Lastminute.com), communication services are being profoundly affected 
by the Internet.  
Skype, founded in 2003, and sold to e-Bay by the end of 2005 for US$ 2.6 billion, is a 
remarkable example. Niklas Zennström stated Skype’s value proposition very clearly: 
‘To change the way people communicate for free’21. Skype implemented the notion 
that it is possible to make a long distance call with good quality for free or very low 
cost, compared to traditional methods. This is changing the rules of the mainstream 
industry. As long as Christensen (1997), with his concept of ‘disruptive technology’, 
emphasizes the trajectory of one technology around a mainstream market, the concept 
of value innovation modifies the rules and best practices that characterize the  
mainstream market.  
As it is widespread in the telecommunication industry, the uncertainty level is high, as 
the technology and its trajectory is predictable to a certain extent, but not the way it is 
going to be used, even more now that customer interaction is increasing. In order to 
minimize this uncertainty, traditional telecom operators are creating what can be 
called ‘platform for innovation’. This platform is based on Internet technologies (e.g. 
IP – Internet Protocol) and enables the operator to deliver services combining voice, 
video and data seamlessly. The immediate effect is the convergence of networks and 
services, and the possibility of many firms from different industries to cooperate in 
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 Skype Night event on 30 November 2005. 
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ways that were not possible (or feasible) before. Market boundaries between 
infrastructure (BT, Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom) and content (e.g. Time 
Warner, Disney) firms are blurring and opening up new opportunities.  
New value propositions are redefining business models. No wonder now that 
innovation is more around business models than around products and services. And 
customers talk less about the networks and technologies, and more about the services 
and how to use them. And ultimately, the recurrent question is ‘what is value in the 
telecom industry?’ Also, as market boundaries are increasingly being broken, the idea 
of ‘telecom industry’ needs to be revised.  
The idea of value innovation sets a space where imitation and conformance to existing 
market rules are outdated. If start-up and traditional firms want to survive, they are 
now invited to change the rules of the market. And this is not possible to do it alone. 
So, that is why the power of partnership between start-ups and traditional firms 
become important, also in the early stages of a research project, and the concept of 
open innovation becomes more and more popular in the telecom industry. Open and 
value innovation are closely interconnected.  
6.3. Service Innovation 
Open and value innovation are setting up the causes and conditions for service 
innovation: while building a platform for innovation based on Internet technologies, 
what are the services that will render revenues and profits? 
While the traditional telecom operators and service providers struggle to find out what 
are the services ‘of the future’, Internet firms like Google, Yahoo and Skype, and 
websites like Myspace.com and Youtube move fast, creating new rules and new ‘blue 
oceans’ of market. However, traditional telecom operators are targeting the more 
robust market (business and critical mission applications) that Internet firms will 
unlikely address. Other concern is the limitation of the Internet infrastructure, as 
demand for high bandwidth services grow, and the argument that the Internet 
architecture has ‘ossified’ (Handley, 2006). Paradoxically, the architecture of the 
Internet, which allows unprecedented change, does not evolve significantly since the 
early 1990’s (Handley, 2006, p. 127). 
One consequence of the convergence of networks and services is that the internal 
organisation divisions are also being broken. The silos in structure and management 
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are being dismantled and a reconfiguration of organisational structure and capabilities 
is taking place. BT, for example, is identifying and implementing the so-called 
‘common capabilities’ which allow the faster development of new services. Common 
capabilities are reusable elements, building blocks that reduce the time to deliver new 
services. Some of these common capabilities are: authentication, digital rights 
management, secure connections, directory and profile. Another interesting aspect of 
the capability approach is the decoupling of the physical elements in the infrastructure 
from the service and support logic, such a way that any change in the service level 
does not translate necessarily into a change in the infrastructure level. This approach 
is commonly adopted in the computer industry, where new applications are developed 
around a ‘common’ operating system (e.g Windows, Unix or Linux) (Levy, 2005).   
The temporary and unique characteristic of creating new services and the faster time-
to-market that is demanded stimulates the development of ‘good project management’ 
practices. For the infrastructure transformation, BT created the ‘BT 21st Century’, 
which is an umbrella project for the whole transformation of its PSTN infrastructure 
into a new IP-based NGN infrastructure. Also the use of project management concepts 
and project managers has been increasing in BT and other traditional telecom 
operators.   
6.3.1. The Rise of Networked IT Services as Integrated Solutions at BT 
The phenomenon of integrated solutions is usually analyzed from the supplier 
perspective, e.g. a manufacturer of one specific product that offers services around it, 
such as financial services, operational services, business consultancy and system 
integration (cf. Davies (2003)). BT started its transformation around the year 2000, 
when high debts were threatening the survival of the firm. At that time, in April 2000, 
it was created one division called Ignite to be responsible of broadband IP network 
business, including Syntegra, their systems integration business. Ignite was a response 
to the growing market for data communications led by the IP technology. By the end 
of 2001, BT Ignite was being considered to be floated22. In November 2001, Andy 
Green was appointed as CEO of BT Ignite23. In 2002, BT Ignite was described as the 
‘business services and solutions division, serving customers worldwide’24. And its 
                                               
22
 BT Annual Report 2001 p. 8  
23
 BT Annual Report 2002 p. 5  
24
 BT Annual Report 2002 p. 15 
 36 
activities were realigned to focus on multi-site corporate customers25. In April 2003, 
BT Ignite was renamed to BT Global Services 26 , BT’s ‘managed services and 
solutions provider, serving multi-site customers worldwide’. And the target was the 
‘10.000 global multi-site organizations with European operations’27.  
In 2005, BT Global Services is described as addressing ‘the networked IT services 
needs of multi-site organisations including major companies with significant global 
requirements and large organisations in target local markets’28. Networked IT services 
was the expression adopted as ICT (Information and Communications Technologies) 
services was not understood by some customers in North America29. 
The starting point can be the value stream in CoPS shown by Davies (2003, p. 343), 
where he highlights for stages: manufacturing, systems integration, operational 
services and service provision. Integrated solutions occur in the ‘manufacturing-
services’ interface for suppliers of CoPS. In the case of BT, as a large user of CoPS, 
integrated solutions occur in the service provision. Networked IT services are 
provided to multi-site firms.  
As Davies (2004) points out, in order to analyze how firms are moving into high-
value integrated solutions, it is necessary to identify (i) the firms’ strength or ‘base’ 
and (ii) how firms diversify to other activities which render or will render profitable 
growth. BT passed through difficult times in the beginning of the 2000’s and in 2002, 
Ben Verwaayen, BT CEO, suggested that BT needed to understand their strengths 
better and play those strengths. In this chapter, I argue that providing integrated 
solutions to large multi-site corporations is the strength that BT is playing to 
transform itself. Networked IT services represent both the convergence of 
telecommunications and IT, and the emergence of integrated solutions as the main 
business model for the transition to Next Generation Networks.  
The core capability of BT was and continues to be the design, operation and 
maintenance of networks and offer services based on those networks. These networks 
used to be telecommunications networks, and at a certain point, it was renamed to 
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communications networks 30 . Although there are signs that value will migrate to 
services on top of the network (broadband horizontal applications), there are currently 
major opportunities to offer integrated solutions to large multi-site corporations in 
Europe. BT, through its major transformation project, BT 21CN continues to invest 
and improve its core capability in designing, operating and maintaining networks. 
However the nature of the services being offered is changing from fragmented 
products and services, like fixed-network calls, exchange lines, receipts from other 
operators, wireless products and private services to integrated solutions including 
‘desktop and network equipment and software; transport and connectivity; managed 
LAN (local area network), WAN (wide area network) and IPVPN (internet protocol 
virtual private network) services; managed mobility; applications hosting; storage and 
security services; and business transformation and change management services’31. IT 
systems have increased substantially in large firms. Their complexity and 
internetworking make such firms to spend huge amounts of money and effort building 
and managing them. BT (and other operators) sensed an opportunity to provide their 
large business customers with the simplicity of one contract/provider, allowing them 
to concentrate on their core business (when IT is not their core business).  
Incumbents like BT chose not to produce and manufacture their systems and 
equipment since the 1990’s, preferring to buy from the market. Thus, BT concentrates 
its efforts in the architecture and design of the network and selects the best vendors to 
realize them. The performance of integrated solutions can be measured by the 
performance of BT Global Services. The table below shows how the turnover has 
evolved and in 2006, it has surpassed both BT Retail and BT Wholesale.  
Moving from a base in services 
BT has been experiencing decreasing turnover from fixed-to-fixed voice calls in the 
last years. This can be seen in part from the revenues from BT Retail. The strategy is 
then to move from traditional fixed-line voice services to networked IT services. This 
comprises integrated solutions for large firms which intend to outsource their network 
operations. The traditional value stream for capital goods is as follows (Davies, 2004, 
p. 737):  
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Manufacture  systems integration  operational services  service provision 
The interface between systems integration and operational services represents the 
locus of what Wise and Baumgartner (1999) going downstream from manufacturing 
to services. Incumbent operators like BT are service firms that do not have 
manufacturing activities for a long time. In BT’s perspective, systems integration 
occurs when building infrastructure, such as the BT 21CN. In this case, BT needs 
systems integration capabilities to match the systems integration capabilities of the 
suppliers and integrate multiple vendors in a single mega-project. The value stream is 
extended by BT considering the service provision as an integrated solution, where BT 
offers systems integration, managed services and consultancy services to large multi-
site corporations.  
The end service provision is transformed into another stage of systems integration and 
operational services as follows: 
Manufacture  systems integration  operational services  systems integration  
operational services  service provision 
Integrated solutions occur then in two interfaces: one in the manufacturing-services 
interface with specialized equipment suppliers, and another in the communications-
business IT infrastructure of multi-site firms.  
Among the capabilities of BT to deliver networked IT services are business 
transformation, change management, large scale project management, process 
transformation, solutions design and innovation.  
Among the capabilities for integrated solutions, the following seems to be important 
for BT: 
Systems Integration 
BT has won many contracts to ‘provide and manage networks’ for multi-site 
organizations. Providing networks means to integrate different equipment and systems 
from various external suppliers (e.g. Cisco, Nortel, …).  
Managed (Operational) Services 
Besides building and/or upgrading the network, BT becomes responsible for 
monitoring the performance of the network and taking care of the maintenance and 
preventive actions to keep the network running according to the SLA levels.  
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Consultancy Services (Professional Services) 
‘Consultancy services are also provided to help organisations understand network 
performance, operate their networks and applications efficiently and transform their 
business to gain advantage in the digital networked economy’32. 
About Financing 
BT does not report on financing services specifically. Vendor financing may be 
provided by the vendors directly.  
The Performance of BT Global Services 
The activities of BT Global Services include: Global IP Infrastructure Services, 
Applications and Application Management Services, Outsourcing and Managed 
Services, Business Transformation Services. These activities are substantially done 
with partners: Cisco, Intel, Alcatel, Nortel, Vodafone, and Marconi for Global IP 
Infrastructure Services; Computacenter and Microsoft for Applications & Application 
Management Services; Siemens, CSC and HP for Outsourcing and Managed Services; 
and Accenture for Business Transformation Services.  
The types of contracts that BT is now dealing with are of higher values, long term (for 
some 3 to 10 years usually) and one important part for the profitability of this business 
is the re-sign of major contracts. BT claims that around 90% are re-signed. ‘Long-
term contract is essential for the profitability of the business model’. 
Each contract represents a different customer with different needs. In this sense, skills 
in large scale project management are important. In some instances, the learning in 
one project can be transferred to another, but the real gain (and profit) occurs when 
the contract is re-signed. Large business-to-business contracts where factors like trust, 
reliability and security are valued.  
In the year 2005, BT Global Services had its first full year operating profit33. It is 
interesting that this division was being considered to be sold in the beginning of the 
2000’s, during the debt crisis. 
 As the CEO of BT Global Services declared: ‘We have to be an integrator’34. As BT 
is offering networked IT services as integrated solutions for the interconnection of 
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multiple sites of large multinational firms, BT cannot be physically present in every 
place where the customer wants to be. So, BT needs to work with partnerships and 
integration. BT Global Services has restructured its division from a fragmented one to 




As the cost of failure is lower, firms may grow not analyzing the size of markets or its 
profitability, as they are largely uncertain and unknown in advance. They may grow 
by ‘early adopters’ and setting up strategies to scale up the adoption to mass market. 
This mechanism of scaling up, typical of startup companies, is becoming of 
paramount importance for incumbent companies. To grow around early adopters and 
be able to combine and integrate early adopters of different stages and communities 
may be an important source of competitive advantage. It is expected that the transition 
to the 21CN, the all-IP network, will provide BT with the capability to ‘play’ with 
new services with low cost of failure, and with the agility of smaller firms.   
In the telecom industry there is nowadays much discussion about the platform for new 
services, and convergence of fixed and mobile networks. ‘Telecommunications 
industry is becoming the production technology of many industries’ (Thurow, 1992). 
A standard platform called IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem) is under evaluation and 
there is much hype around it now (in 2005). This IMS platform aims the ‘creation and 
control of high value, real-time IP applications, such as conferencing, messaging & 
multiplayer games’ (Finnie, 2005). Underlying this platform is the necessity of 
telecom operators to make money from applications and confront the low cost or free 
model of the Internet. Then, it is possible to see a clear tension between the low 
cost/free model of the Internet and the charged (as much as possible for the premium 
services) of the incumbent telecommunication firms model. Examples of the Internet 
model are Skype, Yahoo and Google, which offer free or low cost communication 
services. More radical approaches are being attempted by firms like Popular 
Telephony, which is trying to deploy the concept of serverless networks, extending 
the decentralized and distributed characteristics of the Internet model to business 
customers. The battle in services will be between services controlled and charged by 
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the telecommunication companies and the disintermediated services, where the 
Internet companies use the broadband pipes of the telecom companies, but these do 
not take part in the revenues that these services provide.  
The transition from PSTN to IP NGN is about enabling IP communications, where 
incumbent fixed-line operators build a ‘flexible factory of innovative services’, a 
converged network, transporting voice, video and data in one single network, 
reducing operation and capital expenditure, and making possible new sources of 
revenue with the combined services. With this IP-based network, it is expected that 
the incumbent operators have more flexibility in adapting the network to the customer 
and not the opposite. This implies in finding new niche markets as well as retaining 
existing and new customers. It may be possible, then, to provide ‘mass customization 
of services’, which is not possible with the current traditional PSTN technology. As 
long as more and more people have access to several competitive communication 
providers, it becomes fundamental to be able to retain customers. Thus, the 
telecommunications networks are now called customer-centric.  
Open standards at the complex system level are blurring the boundaries of networks 
and industries, and driving convergence. And convergence is driving new services. 
Combined voice, data, video and mobility services can be offered by different types of 
firms: fixed and mobile operators (e.g. BT and Vonage), cable TV firms (e.g. NTL), 
Internet firms (Skype, Google and Yahoo).  
It is interesting how the words ‘disruptive’ and ‘simplicity’ are being used in the 
telecommunications industry nowadays. ‘Disruptive’ is used to express any ‘radical’ 
change, not only the way Christensen (1997) conceptualized it. Simplicity is used in 
the sense of delivering simplicity to the customer. ‘Simple to use interfaces and 
devices’ is now a common expression in the industry. Complexity and simplicity 
seem to be different aspects of the same reality. In order to achieve simplicity at the 
end customer, the all-IP Next Generation Network is being built, and the result is very 
complex. It is the role of the suppliers, working with the service providers, to manage 
and understand complexity in order to deliver simplicity.  
Cost savings obtained by economies of scale, scope and system are the drivers behind 
the momentum of telecommunications systems (Davies, 1996). The same way these 
are the drivers behind the transition to NGN. However, they are not the only drivers. 
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It seems that these cost-saving drivers are important in order to justify to the board 
and shareholders the capital investment in the transition. Another driver has to do with 
competitiveness and being able to build and maintain a network which will be flexible 
enough to cope with future demands in terms of services and applications. It is 
possible to say that the intensity of the drivers may vary along with the evolution of 
the transition. Cost-saving drivers are more intense in the beginning, but as long as the 
transition evolves, the possibility to create new services and applications becomes the 
main driver.  
Thurow (1992) questions if computer telecommunications is truly revolutionary, 
pointing out that ‘historically only two inventions have revolutionized our industrial 
world […]: train and electricity’ (p. 1). He argues that the answer to this question will 
be possible when looking back to the events, but he suggests that this could be a third 
major revolution.  Beniger (1986) points out the control revolution of the information 
society. Control refers to the ‘purposive influence toward a predetermined goal’ (p. 7). 
The term revolution was borrowed from astronomy and first used in political 
discourse in seventeenth-century England, meaning the restoration of a previous form 
of government. Then, with the French Revolution, it acquired the meaning of an 
abrupt and often violent change, as it is nowadays (Beniger, 1986). It seems that the 
transition to NGN will lead to the services revolution, where new services may 
change profoundly human habits. 
 ‘Services cannot proliferate unless users have the facilities to control them, wherever 
they are’ (Feneyrol, 1998). The issue of control is one of the most important in the 
information society. One point is users controlling the services in order to customize it 
according their needs. The other point is the service provider controlling the service in 
order to obtain revenues from it. With the Internet and broadband, the service 
providers run the risk of being only ‘pipe’ suppliers, but not being able to control and 
charge the services which use that pipe.  
 
8. Final Considerations 
 
Analysing the empirical data collected and using the framework of infrastructure and 
services (in layers), it became clear that the some of the main issues for the 
survivability of BT are: 
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• To find its strengths or core capabilities and exploring them to generate new 
source of revenues. Networked IT services proved to be such a core capability, 
offering integrated solutions to large customers, interconnecting multi-site 
operations.    
• To transform the infrastructure, adopting the IP (Internet Protocol) technology, 
and switching off the circuit-based PSTN. For this BT established a large and 
complex project: BT 21CN. Here the aim is to build a network that will serve as a 
platform that will allow the development of new services by BT and with the 
collaboration of external parties. Main capabilities in focus here are project 
management and systems integration for large and complex projects in the context 
of a large user of technology and complex products and systems.  
• To revitalise the innovation processes within BT, adopting the open innovation 
model. A new structure is put in place, where innovation is owned at the chairman 
level. Also, this shows how BT is reorganised its structure for innovation and 
establishing mechanisms to take better advantage of external innovations and 
integrate into BT’s internal processes. It also shows how BT is using venture 
capital, Intellectual Property rights and collaboration with universities in order to 
foster innovation.   
Technology-focused innovation is becoming commoditised in this fast moving and 
unpredictable world (BT, 2006). ‘It is not technology per se that matters, but 
technology-in-use, and that is precisely what is so hard to predict ahead of time’ 
(Chesbrough, 2003, p. xiii). It is not the technology but its use that is disruptive35. 
Innovation is occurring increasingly around business models36 and people are talking 
less about the network and technology associated, and more about how to use the 
network and technology 37 . So, in a world where knowledge is abundant and 
technology is available to whom is capable to absorb or buy it, service innovation may 
flourish as a consequence of technology-in-use practices.  
The concept of open innovation tries to change the direction of the innovation flow, in 
the past predominantly from the laboratory to the store shelf, now with the input of 
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the end-user and from partners of various parts of society (not only industry, but 
academia,  
Convergence is about the manifestation of a single reality, not bounded by 
technological limitations. The transmission of voice, video and data, separately, using 
different technologies and networks was a matter of simplification and of the limited 
capabilities of past times. The evolution of technology leads to a reality that 
converges on the customer. Integrated solutions can be considered an instance of 
convergence. 
Innovation is taken as a long-term project to deliver a structured innovation process 
championed at chairman level. And traditional telecom operators are being forced to 
innovate their process of innovation in order to survive. One initial step is to create a 
more dynamic R&D culture, as BT is doing with its ‘open innovation’ initiative.   
Incumbent telecommunications operators are supposed to be increasingly extracting 
value from platform and software sharing, exposing its ‘capabilities’ to third parties 
and developing business models to interoperate with other companies. Thus, the 
ability to expose their capabilities in services, not to hide them, will be determinant of 
its success. And, in this context, the concept of open innovation and value innovation 
also find a fertile ground to be applied in services in the communications industry.  
Important dynamic capabilities identified in this context are strategic planning, project 
management, new product/service development (especially software development), 
supported by systems integration. 
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Appendix 1 – Research stages, data collection and empirical 
sources  
 
Table 1: Overview of the research stages for the data collection and empirical sources 
being used.  
 Stage 1: March 2005 – July 
2005 (Exploration) 
Stage 2: August 2005 – March 
2006 (Exploitation) 
Stage 3: April 2006 – March 
2007 (Exploitation and 
Confirmation) 
Objectives •  Understanding industry 
structure, processes and 
resources to deliver and 
build NGN;  
•  Identifying main suppliers 
of NGN; 
•  Identifying main fixed-line 
incumbent telecom 
operators building NGN; 
•  Exploring the dynamics of 
capabilities development, 
disruption and inter-firm 
collaboration. 
• Exploring in detail the specifics 
of industry change in terms of 
innovation and capabilities 
development in order to deliver 
and build the NGN; 
• Exploring in detail the 
dynamics of innovation and 
capabilities development in the 
transition to NGN of BT 21CN.  
• Finalizing data collection 
about the innovation dynamics 
of the transition to NGN at 
industry level; 
• Finalizing the data collection 
about the capabilities 
development in BT and BT 
21CN; 
• Resolving remaining 
discrepancies. 
Interviews Interviews with suppliers, 
service providers, industry 
analysts, consultants and 
regulators: 
•  45 interviews in CEBIT 
2005;  
•  26 interviews in VON 
Europe 2005; 
•  12 interviews in IEE 
Course; 
•  8 interviews in 
LightReading Carrier 
Ethernet.  
Interviews with suppliers, service 
providers, industry analysts, 
consultants and regulators: 
•  5 interviews in LightReading 
Live – The Future of Telecom; 
•  21 interviews in Carriers 
World 2005; 
•  38 interviews in Broadband 
World Forum Europe 2005; 
•  20 interviews in ITU-T NGN 
Focus Group and Industry 
Event 
Interviews with suppliers, 
service providers, industry 
analysts, consultants:  
•  29 interviews in CEBIT 2006; 
•  9 interviews in 21st Century 
Communications World 
Forum; 





•  Annual reports; 
•  SEC filings; 
•  Press releases; 
•  Newspapers an magazine 
articles; 
•  Product catalogues; 
•  Official websites; 
•  Pulver Research website; 
•  Market research reports; 
• Trade Conference 
presentations; 
• Webinars. 
•  Annual reports; 
•  SEC filings; 
•  Press releases; 
•  Newspapers an magazine 
articles; 
•  Product catalogues; 
•  Official websites; 
•  Pulver Research website; 
•  Market research reports; 
•  BT Technology Journal; 
•  Trade Conference 
presentations; 
• Webinars. 
• Annual reports; 
•  SEC filings; 
•  Press releases; 
•  Newspapers an magazine 
articles; 
•  Product catalogues; 
•  Official websites; 
•  Pulver Research website; 
•  Market research reports; 
•  BT Technology Journal; 





•  CEBIT 2005 
•  VON Europe 2005 
•  LightReading Carrier 
Ethernet 
•  IEE Course on Telecoms 
NGN 
• LightReading Live: The Future 
of Telecom 
• Carriers World 2005 
• Broadband World Forum 
Europe 2005 
• ITU-T Focus Group on NGN 
• ITU-T NGN Industry Event  
• CEBIT 2006 
• 21st Century Communications 
World Forum 
• VoIP for Business 2006 
• Broadband World Forum 
Europe 2006 
• IP 06 
• The New Telco: Europe 2006 
• IP Leaders 2007 
• VoIP for Business 2007 
• C5 World Forum 2007 
• Carrier Ethernet Expo 2007 
 
 
 
 
